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I. Introduction 
Government and their subsidiary agencies are among the world’s largest 
purchasers of goods, services and works. Such purchase often represent 10% to 
15% of a country’s GNP. The international trade in government-purchased 
products and services is steadily on the increase and currently amounts to 
trillions of dollars. Most of these large markets have traditionally been closed to 
foreign suppliers and contractors through the operation of formal and informal 
systems of discrimination favoring the domestic industry. 
The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) that was negotiated 
in the Tokyo Round required its member countries to accord national and MFN 
treatment to government purchases. The obligation to extend such treatment  
applied to purchases made by the government agencies listed by each member 
country in the annexes to the Agreement. Theses annexes formed an integral part 
of the Agreement. The Agreement further required the listed agencies to make 
their purchases by inviting tenders, in which foreign suppliers should have a fair 
and equitable opportunity to participate. 
The Tokyo Round Agreement, which applied to trade in goods, was 
extensively revised and broadened in the Uruguay Round to cover government 
purchases of services. The new GPA is, however, plurilateral and WTO member 
countries are not obliged to join it. The Agreement’s current countries1 are 
                                                                 
1 Signatories : Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong(China), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the 
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predominantly developed countries. Only two developing countries/areas – Hong 
Kong and the Republic of Korea – have so far acceded to it. 
Korea became a signatory to the Agreement on Government Procurement 
signed at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994. While the GPA entered into force for 
existing Parties on 1 January 1996, it entered into force for Korea on 1 January 
1997. 
The report of the Panel on Korea – Measures Affecting Government 
Procurement was adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body on 19 June 2000. This 
dispute related to the Inchon International Airport (IIA) project, which was being 
constructed in the Republic of Korea. At issue was whether the entities that had 
had procurement responsibility for the project since its inception are "covered 
entities" under the GPA. The United States also raised the issue of whether the 
procurement practices of these entities were or had been inconsistent with 
Korea's obligations under the Agreement on Government Procurement and 
whether they nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States under 
that Agreement. 
In this dispute, the panel concluded that the entities which had been 
conducting procurement for the IIA project were not covered entities under 
Korea's Appendix I of the GPA and were not otherwise covered by Korea's 
obligations under the GPA. The panel also concluded that the United States had 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Netherlands, Aruba, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States 
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not demonstrated that benefits reasonably expected to accrue under the GPA, or 
in the negotiations resulting in Korea's accession to the GPA, were nullified or 
impaired by measures taken by Korea. 
This was the first time that a Panel had to interpret the terms of the GPA. 
This dispute was mainly related to the interpretation of the Appendix of the GPA 
and demonstrated the basic principle and method in the process of interpretation. 
It also showed the basic concept of non-violation argument from the disputes of 
GATT and WTO and profound legal theory whether the expected benefits can be 
argued as non-violation. Further, it gave us a good precedence by its legal 
decision regarding the error in negotiation as we can use it when we give 
concession during international trade negotiation or when we check counterpart’s 
concession. 
This paper aims to present the implementation of government 
procurement in the WTO system by the legal analysis of the rulings by the Panel 
on Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement. In this paper, I present 
the broad overview of the basic structure of the WTO GPA in chapter II. In 
chapter III, the historical review of the Korea’s accession to the WTO GPA is 
presented. Chapter IV examines the dispute panel decision: Korea – Measures 
Affecting Government Procurement. Chapter V provides the proposals to be 
considered in future efforts to enhance the current GPA. The conclusion is given 
in Section VI.  
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II. Basic Structure of the WTO GPA 
1. General  
Government Procurement refers to the activity a government in 
purchasing goods and services for its own requirements and not for resale. 
Government purchases of goods and services at the national and subnational 
level are substantial. By one estimate, the world market for government 
procurement exceeds $1 trillion annually. For the very reason that governments 
purchase significant amounts of goods and services, historically strong political 
pressures exist for making such purchases exclusively from local sellers. 
 
2. Historical Background to the Evolution of Rules 
In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT), originally 
negotiated in 1947, government procurement was explicitly excluded from the 
key national treatment obligation. Since it is estimated that government 
procurement typically represents 10-15% of GDP, this represents a considerable 
gap in the multilateral trading system. A growing awareness of the trade-
restrictive effects of discriminatory procurement policies and of the desirability 
of fulfilling these gaps in the trading system resulted in a first effort to bring 
government procurement under internationally agreed trade rules in the Tokyo 
Round of Trade Negotiations. As a result, the first Agreement on Government 
Procurement was signed in 1979 and entered into force in 1981. 
In parallel with the Uruguay Round, Parties to the Agreement held 
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negotiations to extend the scope and coverage of the Agreement. The Agreement 
on Government Procurement (GPA) was signed in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 
and entered into force on 1 January 1996. 
The renegotiated GPA improved the Tokyo Round Government 
Procurement Code in at least three aspects. First, the Code’s rules on bid 
challenge procedures and dispute resolution are strengthened. Second, the new 
Agreement  expands the Code vertically by covering subcentral levels of 
government and central government-owned utilities and transportation facilities. 
Third, the new Agreement expands the Government Procurement Code 
horizontally by covering government procurement  of services and construction 
contracts.2  Besides these achievements, the negotiators added an important new 
Member, Korea. 
The GPA is one of the WTO’s so-called Annex IV or Plurilateral 
Agreements, signifying that it applies only to WTO Members that have signed 
it.3 
 
3. The Agreement on Government Procurement 
A. The Aim of the Agreement 
The objective  of the GPA is to subject government procurement  to 
international competition by extending the GATT principles of nondiscrimination 
                                                                 
2 Roj Bhala and Kevin Kennedy, World Trade Law, Lexis Law Publishing(1998), p.1314-1315 
3 There are four Plurilateral agreements: the GPA, the civil aircraft agreement, and the arrangements on 
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(national treatment and MFN) and transparency to the tendering procedures of 
government entities. The GPA applies only to those entities listed in 
schedules(Annexes) of each signatory nation. Over time, the entity coverage has 
been expanded through periodic negotiations.4 
B. Coverage of the Agreement 
The agreement applies to any law, regulation, procedure, or practice 
regarding any procurement by entities covered by the Agreement as specified in 
Appendix I. 5   Appendix I is divided into five Annexes that contain the 
equivalent of the schedule of commitments made under GATT and GATS: 
· Annex 1, central government entities 
· Annex 2, subcentral government entities 
· Annex 3, all other entities that procure in accordance with the provision 
of the Agreement, e.g., government-owned utilities 
· Annex 4, Services 
· Annex 5, construction contracts 
Each Annex also contains value thresholds for each party. 
The product coverage of the Agreement is also determined by the 
Annexes. As far as goods are concerned, in principle all procurement is covered, 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
bovine meat and dairy products. 
4 Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, “Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government 
Procurement”, in Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: The WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement, edited by Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis, The University of Michigan 
Press(1997), p.13 
5 Government Procurement Code Article I:1 <http://www.wto.org/wto/govt/govt.htm> 
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unless specified otherwise in an Annex. 
C. Substantive provisions 
The Agreement’s most important obligation requires purchasing entities 
to extend to imported products, services and suppliers national and MFN 
treatment. The first prevents them from giving price or other preferences to 
domestic suppliers; the second prohibits them from discriminating among outside 
supplying countries.6 
D. Operational Provisions 
The agreement contains a number of detailed procedural obligations 
which procuring entities have to fulfill to ensure the effective application of its 
basic principles. The purpose of these procedural requirements is to guarantee 
that access to covered procurement is effectively open and that an equal 
opportunity is given to foreign supplies and suppliers in competing for 
government contracts. 
The Agreement allows the use of open, selective and limited tendering 
procedures, provided they are consistent  with the provisions laid out in Articles 
VII to XVI. Under open procedures all interested suppliers may submit a tender.7 
Under selective tendering procedures only those suppliers invited to do so by the 
entity may submit a tender. 8  To ensure optimum effective  international 
                                                                 
6 International Trade Center, Business Guide to the Uruguay Round, Commonwealth Secretariat(1996), 
p.300 
7 Government Procurement Code Article VII:3(a) 
8 id, Articles VII:3(b) and X 
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competition, purchasing entities are required to invite tenders from the maximum 
number of foreign suppliers. Under limited tendering procedures the entity 
contacts the potential suppliers individually. 9  The Agreement closely 
circumscribes the situations in which this method can be used, for example in the 
absence of tenders in response to an open tender or selective tender or in cases of 
collusion, or for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by events 
unforeseeable by the entity.10 
The Agreement contains obligations on technical specifications in order 
to prevent entities from discriminating against and among foreign foods and 
suppliers through the technical characteristics of products and services that they 
specify.11 
Prior to the actual tendering process, Parties are required to publish an 
invitation to participate in the form of a tender notice in a publicly accessible 
publication indicated in Appendix II to the Agreement.12 
E. Greater Public Scrutiny of Award Decisions 
Information must also be provided, after the award of the contract, on the 
award decision in the form of a notice, giving information on such matters as the 
nature and quantity of the products and services in the contract award, the name 
and address of the winning tenderer, and the value of the winning award or the 
                                                                 
9 id, Article VII:3(c) 
10 id, Article XV 
11 id, Article VI 
12 id, Articles IX and XII 
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highest and the lowest offer taken into account in the award contract. In addition, 
if an unsuccessful bidder requests it, the purchasing entity is required to give the 
bidder its reasons for both the rejection and the selection.13 
There is a general requirement to publish laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions, administrative rulings of general application and any procedures 
regarding government procurement covered by the Agreement.14 
F. Challenge Procedure 
The Agreement also calls on its member countries to establish at the 
national level an independent review body to hear challenges or complaints and 
requests for redress from domestic or foreign suppliers against a purchasing 
entity which in their view has not adhered to the rules of the Agreement in 
awarding a contract. The procedure for investigating such challenges should 
provide for: interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement’s rules, 
including measures which may result in the suspension of the procurement 
process; or payment of compensation to the challenging tenderer, which may be 
limited to the costs of preparing the tender or the challenge. 
In addition, when the government of the country where the foreign 
supplier is situated is satisfied that the rules of the Agreement have not been 
followed by the entity in awarding the contract, it can invoke WTO dispute 
                                                                 
13 id, Article XVIII 
14 id, Article XIX 
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settlement procedures.15 
G. Special Provisions for Developing Countries 
The Agreement  recognizes the development, financial and trade needs of 
developing countries, in particular least-development countries, and allows 
special and differential treatment in order to meet their specific development 
objectives. Development objectives of developing countries should be taken into 
account in the negotiation of coverage of procurement by entities in developed 
and developing countries. The Agreement also contains provisions on: technical 
assistance; establishment of information centers giving information on 
procurement practices and procedures in developed countries; and special  
treatment for least-developed countries.16 
 
III. Korea’s Accession to WTO GPA 
Korea tried to participate in Tokyo Round Agreement but it was frustrated 
due to large difference between Korea’s concession offer and the Parties request. 
United States strongly requested Korea to be a party of the GPA in US-Korea 
trade negotiations and Korea promised to accede. In a communication dated 25 
June 1990, Korea indicated its interest in exploring the possibility of acceding to 
the GPA. 
Further, in a communication dated 20 September 1991, the Government 
                                                                 
15 id, Article X 
16 id, Article V 
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of the Republic of Korea indicated that following submission of its initial offer to 
the Committee on Government Procurement on 25 June 1990, it had held 
bilateral consultations with the Parties in relation to its offer list.  The 
communication also requested permission to participate in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  This request was acceded to. 
Leading up to its accession to the GPA on 15 April 1994, Korea 
submitted to the Committee on Government Procurement, a series of offers 
concerning its commitments under the GPA upon accession. 
Korea became a signatory to the Agreement on Government Procurement 
signed at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994.  There were no further changes made to 
Korea's accession offer between the date of Korea's final offer, namely, 14 
December 1993, and the signing of the new GPA at the Marrakesh Ministerial 
Conference in April 1994. 
While the GPA entered into force for existing Parties on 1 January 1996, 
it entered into force for Korea on 1 January 1997. 
 
IV. Dispute in WTO: “Korea – Measures Affecting Government 
Procurement” 
1. Factual Summary 
A. Factual Background 
On 16 February 1999, the United States requested Korea to hold 
consultations pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
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Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU") and Article XXII of the 
Agreement on Government Procurement regarding certain procurement practices 
of entities concerned with the procurement of airport construction for Inchon 
International Airport ("IIA") in Korea. The European Communities requested to 
join in the consultations on 8 March 1999 and Japan made the same request on 9 
March 1999. Korea accepted neither of these requests. 
A mutually satisfactory solution was not reached during the consultations 
held between the United States and Korea on 17 March 1999. In a 
communication dated 11 May 1999, the United States requested the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) establish a panel to examine the matter.17 
B. Korea’s Accession Offers 
Leading up to its accession to the GPA on 15 April 1994, Korea 
submitted to the Committee on Government Procurement, a series of offers 
concerning its commitments under the GPA upon accession. Table 1 summarizes 
Korea’s accession offers. 
The Government Organization Act (1989) entitled “Establishment and 
Organization of Central Administrative”, “Establishment of Special Local 
Administrative  Organs” and “Establishment of Attached Organizations” 
provisions. The provisions of the Act remained largely the same in all relevant 
respects despite various changes that were made to the Government Act from 30 
                                                                 
17 Report of the Panel, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, (WT/DS163/R), adopted 
on 19 June 2000, paragraph. 1.2 
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December 1989 until Korea’s GPA obligations came into effect. 
C. The Inchon International Airport Project 
The project concerned the construction of Inchon International Airport 
(IIA). The airport was being built on land between two islands, Yongjong and 
Yongyu. The project commenced in 1990. The first phase of construction was 
scheduled to be completed by the end of 2000. Later phases of airport 
construction will continue until 2020 and will be based on future traffic demand. 
While the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) and the 
New Airport Development Group (NADG) under that Ministry were originally 
responsible for the IIA project, the Act on the Promotion of a New Airport for 
Seoul Metropolitan Area Construction (“Seoul Airport Act”) contemplated the 
appointment of an operator for the IIA project. However, the Act did not specify 
the identity of the operator. 
Since the inception of the project, authority for the IIA project had been 
assigned to various authorities or "operators" by the Korean National Assembly. 
On 14 December 1991, authority was assigned to Korea Airports Authority 
(KAA).  On 1 September 1994, authority was transferred to Korea Airport 
Construction Authority (KOACA).  Finally, authority was transferred to the 
Inchon International Airport Corporation (IIAC) on 1 February 1999. Table 2 
summarizes the entities related to the IIA project. 
The Procurement Fund Act  provides that the Office of Supply is primarily 
responsible for procurement using government procurement funds. 
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D. Procedural Background 
At its meeting on 16 June 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body agreed to 
establish a panel in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of the DSU and 
Article XXII of the GPA, with the following standard terms of reference pursuant 
to Article XXII:4 GPA. The European Communities and Japan reserved third 
party rights.  
The Panel was composed on 30 August 1999. The Panel heard the parties 
to the dispute on 19 October 1999 and 11 November 1999. The interim report 
was issued to the parties on 3 March 2000. The report of the Panel was circulated 
as an unrestricted document from 1 May 2000 and was adopted by the DSB on 
19 June 2000. 
 
2. Issues 
A. Entities covered under Korea’s Appendix I of GPA 
(1) United States 
a)  According to the United States, “central government entity” in 
Annex 1 includes branch offices and subsidiary organizations as Note 1 states 
that Annex 1 entities "include" certain other organizations. "Include" is a 
broadening term, not a limiting one. Thus, the organizations described in Note 1 
are in addition to the central government entities themselves.  
b)  Even though NADG has not been expressly listed in Korea's 
Schedule, it is nevertheless covered under the GPA by virtue of MOCT's listing. 
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NADG is the organization responsible for IIA construction and that, therefore, 
the IIA is a project of a covered entity. KAA and its successors are branch offices 
or subsidiary organizations of MOCT and the IIA project would, therefore, also 
be covered. 
c)  In regard to the project, given the degree of control exercised by 
MOCT over KAA and its successors, procurements by those entities are actually 
procurements by MOCT and the GPA requirements apply to those procurements. 
The United States pointed to Seoul Airport Act as evidence. Article 4(1) 
of that Act provides that MOCT will establish a "master plan" for the IIA project. 
The United States also referred to Article 7(1) which requires MOCT's approval 
of the project operator's "execution plan" and Article 12 which requires the 
project operator to submit reports to MOCT.  
The United States then referred to the numerous provisions in the Korean 
Aviation Act which require the project operator, KAA, to work under the 
supervision of MOCT. The United States also refers to the obligation of the 
project operator to report to the MOCT under the Seoul Airport Act. 
The United States pointed to MOCT's website which listed the NADG as 
responsible for IIA construction, along with other press and business group 
reports that also referred to MOCT or NADG responsibility for the IIA project. 
d)  The United States further noted that the reference to "procurement 
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for airports" in paragraph (b) of General Note 1 of Korea's Appendix18 confirms 
that there are, in fact, entities listed in Annex 1 of Korea's Schedule that are 
responsible for procurement for airports. Since MOCT, the NADG, KAA, 
KOACA and IIAC are the only entities Korea has held out as being responsible 
for procurements for airports, these are the entities that must be covered under 
Annex 1 for all countries not referred to in the General Note. 
According to the United States, all of these factors showed that MOCT 
was in control of KAA and its successors, or, at the very least, was in control of 
the IIA project.19 
(2) Korea 
a)  Korea responded that there was no textual basis for the US arguments 
about branch offices and subsidiary organizations  as Note 1 to Annex 1 defines 
the scope of the coverage of central government entities under Annex 1. This is 
the most reasonable interpretation of the phrase "as prescribed in the Government 
Organization Act" that is contained in Note 1. Korea disagreed that KAA or its 
successors could be properly described as branch or subsidiary organizations of 
MOCT. While Korea disagreed that there was a "control" test contained in the 
                                                                 
18 General Note 1of Korea's Appendix reads as follows: 
 "Korea will not extend the benefits of this Agreement 
       (a) as regards the award of contracts by the National Railroad Administration, 
       (b) as regards procurement for airports by the entities listed in Annex 1, 
(c) as regards procurement for urban transportation (including subways) by the entities    
          listed in Annexes 1 and 2 
 to suppliers and service providers of member States of the European Communities, Austria, Norway,   
 Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, until such time as Korea has accepted that those countries give  
 comparable and effective access for Korean undertakings to their relevant markets." 
19 supra, paragraphs 7.15-7.22 
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WTO GPA, Korea also argued that KAA was independent both overall and with 
respect to the IIA project. This is because KAA was established by law as an 
independent juristic entity; it authored and adopted its own by-laws; it had its 
own management and employees who were not government employees; it 
authored and adopted its own procurement rules distinct from the general 
government rules; it published bid announcements and requests for proposals of 
its own accord; it concluded contracts with successful bidders on its own behalf; 
and it funded portions of the IIA with its own monies. 
b)  According to Korea, Article 94(1) of the Aviation Act states that it is 
the controlling provision of law unless "otherwise provided by law." In this case, 
the Seoul Airport Act was the controlling law and it explicitly authorized an 
entity other than MOCT to have the responsibility for the IIA project. 
With respect to MOCT's website, Korea argued that this was a product of 
MOCT's public relations department and was not a binding classification of 
responsibilities.  
Korea further argued that the indicia of independence clearly indicated 
that KAA was an independent entity for purposes of coverage by the GPA. Other 
entities such as KAA were typically Annex 3 entities both in Korea and in other 
GPA signatories, if the negotiators agreed to their coverage at all. 
c)  In regard to General Note 1(b), Korea responded that procurement 
for some airports was conducted by covered Annex 1 entities.  Specifically, the 
Seoul and Pusan Regional Airport Authorities are local administrative organs as 
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provided in the Government Organization Act and are therefore covered by 
reason of Note 1 to Annex 1.  Thus, there is nothing inconsistent about 
General Note 1(b) and Korea's position that KAA and its successors, and 
therefore the IIA project, are not covered.20 
B. Practices in Violation of GPA 
(1) United States 
The United States contended that Korea was in violation of Articles by 
imposing deadlines of less than 40 days for receiving tenders from the date of 
publication of the procurement announcements; by imposing qualification 
requirements specifying that an interested foreign supplier must have a license 
that in turn requires that supplier to build or purchase manufacturing facilities in 
Korea; by imposing domestic partnering requirements that force foreign firms to 
partner with, or act as subcontractors to, local Korean firms ; and by not 
establishing effective domestic procedures enabling foreign suppliers to 
challenge alleged breaches of the GPA for procurements related to the IIA project. 
 (2) Korea 
Korea requested the Panel to reject the complaints to the United States on 
the basis that the entities conducting procurement for the IIA are not covered 
entities under Korea's Appendix I of the GPA.21 
 
                                                                 
20 id, paragraphs 7.23-7.27 
21 id, paragraphs 7.1-7.4 
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C. Non-violation Claim: Nullification or Impairment of Benefits 
(1) United States 
The United States proposed that a successful determination of a non-
violation nullification and impairment in the GPA requires to find the following: 
(1) a concession was negotiated and exists; (2) a measure is applied that upsets 
the established competitive relationship; and (3) the measure could not have been 
reasonably anticipated at the time the concession was negotiated. The United 
States argued that the outstanding issue in this case is whether or not there was a 
concession. 
The United States contended that during Korea's GPA accession 
negotiations, the United States bargained for and received from Korea the 
coverage of all government entities responsible for the procurement of products 
and services related to new airport construction projects under Annex 1, but 
Korea’s measures were against its expectation. The United States argue d that 
these measures resulted in the nullifying or impairing benefits - a competitive 
relationship worth - potentially US$6 billion accruing to the United States under 
the GPA.22 
(2) Korea 
In response, Korea argued that the burden placed upon the United States 
to support its non-violation claim under Article XXII:2 of the GPA was 
                                                                 
22 id, paragraphs 7.88-7.89 
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substantial. Korea noted that under DSU Article 26:1(a), "the complaining party 
shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a 
measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement."23 
 
3. Findings 
A. GPA Coverage of the Inchon International Airport Project 
(1) General  
The United States had claimed that the procurement practices with 
respect to the IIA were not consistent with the provisions of the GPA. Korea had 
taken no position with respect to these allegations; rather, Korea argued that the 
entities responsible for IIA procurement were not covered by Korea's GPA 
commitments contained in Appendix I to the GPA. 
Since Korea's final offer of concessions on 14 December 1993 and the 
Members' agreement to the WTO GPA and Korea's accession to it on 15 April 
1994, three entities have been responsible for IIA procurement: KAA, KOACA 
and IIAC. Both parties agreed that Korea had never utilized the procedures 
contained in GPA Article XXIV:6 for modification of its Schedules with respect 
to airport construction. The issue is whether KAA was a covered entity at the 
time that Korea concluded its accession negotiations. 
The GPA Schedule is divided into five annexes covering different types 
                                                                 
23 id, paragraph 7.90 
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of procuring entities. The most relevant annexes are: Annex 1 containing central 
government entities; Annex 2 containing sub-central government entities; and, 
Annex 3 containing other entities that procure in accordance with the provisions 
of the GPA. Generally, there are different procurement thresholds for each Annex. 
The question arises as to how to interpret these Schedules in the event of 
a disagreement. In the  dispute on European Communities – Customs 
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body addressed the 
question of whether and how to apply the normal rules of treaty interpretation 
contained in the Vienna Convention to the interpretation of the language 
contained in a Member's tariff schedule. The Appellate Body provided the 
following views: 
"Tariff concessions provided for in a Member's Schedule – the interpretation of 
which is at issue here – are reciprocal and result from a mutually-advantageous 
negotiation between importing and exporting Members.  A Schedule is made 
an integral part of the GATT 1994 by Article II:7 of the GATT 1994.  
Therefore, the concessions provided for in that Schedule are part of the terms of 
the treaty.  As such, the only rules which may be applied in interpreting the 
meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in 
the Vienna Convention."24 
Like GATT Article II:7 which refers to the tariff Schedules as "integral" 
                                                                 
24 Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer 
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parts of the Agreement, Article XXIV:12 of the GPA states that:  "The Notes, 
Appendices and Annexes to this Agreement constitute an integral part thereof." 
Accordingly, the panel referred to the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law as summarized in the Vienna Convention in order to interpret 
Korea's GPA Schedule.25 
The Panel, therefore, examined Korea's Schedule and determined whether, 
within the ordinary meaning of the terms therein, the entity responsible for IIA 
procurement is covered. Then, in accordance with Article 3226 , the Panel 
examined the preparatory work and the circumstances of the conclusion of the 
treaty including the questions asked of Korea by GPA members during the 
accession process and Korea's responses thereto and the negotiating history27. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Equipment, WT/DS62, WT/DS67, WT/DS68, adopted on 22 June 1998, at paragraph 84 
25 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention reads as follows: 
"1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the     
   terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. 
 2. The context for the purpose of a treaty interpretation shall comprise, in addition to the text, including  
   its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the  
   conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the  
   treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or  
   application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties  
   regarding its interpretation; 
   (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended." 
26 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides guidance on supplementary means of interpretation.  It 
reads as follows: 
"Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: 
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;  or 
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 
27 supra, paragraphs 7.4-7.13 
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(2) Covered Entities under Korea Annex 1 
Regarding the claim of a violation of Korea's commitments under the 
GPA, there were two issues. The first one was the interpretation of Korea's 
Schedule of commitments. The second one was whether there was some other 
test that we should apply to determine if the entity in question was covered by 
Korea's GPA commitments even if not listed.  The United States had argued in 
this regard that the proper test should be whether the procuring entity was 
"controlled" by a listed entity. 
(a) Interpretation of Annex 1 of Korea’s Schedule 
In regard to the status of Note 1 to Annex 1, the Panel noted the panel 
finding in United States - Restrictions on Imports of Sugar ("United 
States - Sugar") wherein the panel observed that Headnotes could be used to 
qualify the tariff concessions themselves.28 The Panel stated that the implication 
of the Findings in United States - Sugar for this case would be that a GPA 
signatory could use Notes to its Schedules to qualify the entity coverage itself. 
Note 1 to Annex 1 states that the "central government entities include 
their subordinate linear organizations, special local administrative organs, and 
attached organs as prescribed in the Government Organization Act of the 
Republic of Korea." As the panel thought  that the definitions of "prescribe" and 
"define" are so close as to make the words virtually synonymous, it agreed with 
                                                                 
28 Report of the Panel on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, adopted on 22 June 1989, 
(BISD 36S/331) at paragraphs 5.2-5.3 and 5.7. 
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Korea that the phrase "as prescribed in" means that the Government Organization 
Act defines the terms listed in the Note.  
As the subordinate linear organizations are defined as individual offices 
rather than organizations in Article 2(3) of the Government Organization Act and 
it had not been argued that KAA fell within any of these offices, the panel 
proceeded on the basis that KAA was not a subordinate linear organization. 
Article 3(1) provides that: "Each central administrative organ may have 
local administrative organs as prescribed by the Presidential Decree except those 
especially prescribed by laws, in case they are necessary for the implementation 
of the duties under its jurisdiction." As examples of such organizations were the 
Seoul and Pusan Regional Airport Authorities, the Panel stated that KAA and its 
successors were not considered local administrative organs.  
As mentioned above, KAA did not fall within the terms of Articles 2(3), 
or 3(1) of the Government Organization Act. The Panel, therefore, concluded that 
KAA did not fall within the terms of Note 1 to Annex 1 of Korea's Schedule.  
The panel, however, further evaluated the extent of Korea’s commitment because 
the United States urged the Panel to interpret Note 1 (and, in particular, the word 
"include") in such a way as to permit them to look beyond Annex 1 itself.29 
(b) Further Evaluation of the Extent of Korea’s Commitment 
Korea argued for a narrow reading of the list in Annex 1 by using Note 1 
                                                                 
29 supra, paragraphs 7.30-7.37 
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as a definition. The United States focused on the term "include" and argued that 
Note 1 broadens the coverage beyond the central government entities listed in 
Annex 1.  
The panel referred to Note 1 of Annex 2 in order to clarify the meaning of 
the subordinate linear organization. Note 1 to Annex 2 reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
"The above sub-central administrative government entities include their 
subordinate organizations under direct control and offices as prescribed in the 
Local Autonomy Law of the Republic of Korea." 
The Panel noted that there are two important observations to make 
regarding this Note to Annex 2. First, there is a term "subordinate organizations" 
as opposed to "subordinate linear organizations." This would support an 
interpretation with respect to Note 1 to Annex 1 that subordinate linear 
organizations is a term of art and does not have a broader meaning inclusive of 
subordinate organizations. Second, when Korea wished to make reference to 
entities under direct control of the listed entities, it made the reference explicit. 
The absence of such a reference in Note 1 to Annex 1 implies that "direct 
control" is not a criterion there. 
However, the Panel pointed out a peculiar structure of the Annex 1 
Schedule where one set of organizations is defined in terms of offices rather than 
entities and to unusual aspect of Note 1 that the comprehensiveness of the list of 
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offices defining subordinate linear organizations could lead to a conclusion that 
the individual entities listed in Annex 1 are virtually without substance except as 
provided in the Government Organization Act. 
The Panel raised the problem that the Note states that the central 
government entities in Annex 1 include subordinate linear organizations, local 
administrative organs and attached organs. They agreed with the United States 
that the term "include" is normally not a limiting or defining term. The relevant 
definition of "include" is: "contain as part of a whole or as a subordinate 
element."30 
The Panel examined the negotiating history of Korea's GPA accession to 
provide some clarity to Note 1 in accordance with paragraph (a) of Article 32 of 
the Vienna Convention. Korea's original offer in 1990 provided for GPA coverage 
of 35 central government entities. In February 1991, Korea provided to the Tokyo 
Round Agreement signatories a Supplementary Explanation of the Note by the 
Republic of Korea dated 29 June 1990 relating to the Agreement on Government 
Procurement. Section 3 of the Supplementary Explanation provided a 
"Clarification of Notes in Korea's Offer." 
The Panel noted that this provided two important aspects of the 
interpretation of Note 1. First, the Supplementary Explanation by its terms was 
intended to clarify the coverage of central government organs, as Note 1 was not 
                                                                 
30 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (Clarendon Press, 1993), Vol. 1 at p. 1337. 
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in itself intended as an extension of coverage to entities other than those listed in 
Annex 1. Secondly, the coverage based on offices was made explicit because 
Note 1 defines the scope of coverage by listing components of central 
government entities themselves.  
Korea had maintained that the entities for which coverage was provided 
under Annex 1 of its Schedule were the Seoul and Pusan Regional Aviation 
offices. The reference to two Regional Aviation Bureaus in the Supplementary 
Explanation supported this assertion. KAA was not included in the list contained 
in the Supplementary Explanation. Furthermore, KAA was not assigned its tasks 
by the Minister; was not listed in Annex 1; nor did Note 1 explicitly include 
KAA in coverage. 
The panel further examined whether the relationship between MOCT and 
KAA was such that KAA's procurement was covered with respect to the IIA even 
though KAA was not explicitly included. 
(c) Evaluation of “Control” 
The United States argued that KAA might be considered a part of MOCT 
because it was controlled, at least for the purposes of the IIA project, by MOCT.  
Korea argued that if the panel were to adopt the US proposed control test, it 
would cause a number of entities included within Korea's Annex 3 commitments 
to be put by operation of law under Annex 1 because such entities would 
arguably be under the "control" of Annex 1 entities. The panel noted that this is 
important because it would change the threshold levels negotiated with respect to 
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the Annex 3 entities. The panel observed that the term "direct control" arose in 
that Note as a means of describing the scope of the concessions in Annex 2 and 
its absence in Note 1 to Annex 1 implies that it has no applicability to Annex 1. 
The United States referred the panel to the Appellate Body decision in 
Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of 
Dairy Products ("Canada – Dairy") for guidance on the question of what 
constitutes "control" of an entity. As the focus of that dispute was whether or not 
the Canadian milk marketing boards were "government agencies"31, the panel 
noted that it is different question than this dispute. The Panel concluded that there 
was no use of the term "direct control" or even "control" in the sense that the 
United States wishes to use it32 because it has not been defined in this manner 
either in the context used in the Tokyo Round Agreement or elsewhere. 
However, the panel also noted that it is not an entirely irrelevant question 
and that the issue of "control" of one entity over another could be a relevant 
criterion for determining coverage of the GPA.33 
(d) Evaluation of the Relationship of the Entities Concerned 
An overly narrow interpretation of "central government entity" may result 
in less coverage under Annex 1 than was intended by the signatories. On the 
                                                                 
31 Appellate Body Report on Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation 
of Dairy Products, (WT/DS103 and WT/DS113), adopted on 27 October 1999, at paragraphs 96-102. 
32 The term "control" does appear in Article XXIV:6(b), but it is referring there to privatization.  That is, 
it is used in the same manner as per the analysis in Canada – Dairy for determining whether an entity is 
"governmental" or not rather than for examining the relationship between entities. 
33 supra, paragraphs 7.50-7.57 
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other hand, an overly broad interpretation of the term may result in coverage of 
entities that were never intended to be covered by signatories. 
The Panel viewed that the relevant questions are: (i) Whether an entity 
(KAA, in this case) is essentially a part of a listed central government entity 
(MOCT) – in other words, are the entities, legally unified? and (ii) Whether KAA 
and its successors have been acting on behalf of MOCT.  
(i) Are the Entities Legally Unified? 
The Panel viewed that KAA was not legally unified with or a part of 
MOCT. There are many factors leading this conclusion - KAA was established 
by law as an independent juristic entity; it authored and adopted its own by-laws;  
it had its own management and employees who were not government employees; 
it published bid announcements and requests for proposals of its own accord; it 
concluded contracts with successful bidders on its own behalf; and it funded 
portions of the IIA project with its own monies. The Panel agreed that KAA and 
its successors and find that these entities were not a part of MOCT. 
(ii) Legal Responsibility for the IIA Project 
In order to determine whether or not KAA and its successors were acting 
on behalf of MOCT, that is, the IIA project was really the legal responsibility of 
MOCT, the Panel reviewed the laws governing construction of the IIA. 
The United States relied heavily on the Korean Aviation Act for support 
for its position that MOCT had the legal responsibility for the IIA project.  
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 94 read as follows: 
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(1) The airport development projects shall be carried out by the 
Minister of Construction and Transportation: Provided, that this 
shall not apply in case (of) provided otherwise [sic] by this Act or 
other Acts and subordinate statutes.  
(2)  Any person other than the Minister of Construction and 
Transportation, who desires to operate the airport development 
projects, shall obtain the permission of the Minister of 
Construction and Transportation, under the conditions as 
prescribed by the Presidential Decree. 
Korea had responded that the provision in Article 94(1) means that the 
Seoul Airport Act is the ultimate controlling statute rather than the Aviation Act. 
The Aviation Act  provides for at least two methods of airport construction. One is 
by MOCT, in which case the whole of the Aviation Act applies. The other is by 
other entities as provided otherwise by law. The Panel agreed with Korea’s 
reading of these statutes and concluded that Seoul Airport Act is such a law. 
(iii) Conclusion 
The question of "control" is not an explicit provision of the GPA. Rather, 
it is a matter of interpretation for the content of the Schedules themselves. The 
United States pointed out that procurement by NADG was unarguably covered 
by the GPA even though it was neither listed explicitly nor directly within the 
definition of a subordinate linear organization or otherwise in Note 1 to Annex 1. 
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Even though Korea responded that NADG was merely an ad hoc task force 
within MOCT, the Panel viewed that this response of Korea somewhat avoided 
the challenge of this example. If the Schedule is completely silent on an entity, it 
may be necessary to look somewhat further to see if there is an affiliation of two 
entities such that they could be considered legally the same entity ( which appears 
to be the case between MOCT and NADG) or one could be acting on behalf of 
another. 
The Panel wanted to complete the examination of the scope of Korea's 
Annex 1 through the relevant aspects of negotiating history of Korea's accession 
to the GPA. After reviewing the negotiating history, the Panel concluded that the 
IIA project were not covered as the entities engaged in procurement for the 
project were not covered entities within the meaning of Article I of the GPA.   
Furthermore, the kind of affiliation that the Panel concluded was necessary to 
render an unlisted entity subject to the GPA is not present in this case.  
Therefore, the Panel did not proceed further and made specific findings with 
respect to the alleged inconsistencies of Korea's procurement practices in this 
regard.34 
B. Allegation of Non-violation Nullification or Impairment 
(1) General  
The Panel noted that the basis for the non-violation claim that the United 
                                                                 
34 id, paragraphs 7.58-7.83 
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States had made in the context of this case was different from the usual case. In 
order to explain this difference clearly, it is necessary to note the bases of a 
traditional non-violation claim. 
The panel in Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film 
and Paper (WT/DS44) ("Japan – Film") summarized the traditional test for non-
violation cases as follows: 
"The text of Article XXIII:1(b) establishes three elements that a 
complaining party must demonstrate in order to make out a cognizable 
claim under Article XXIII:1(b):  (1) application of a measure by a WTO 
Member;  (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement;  and 
(3) nullification or impairment of the benefit as the result of the 
application of the measure."35 
The Panel added the notion that had been developed in all these cases that 
the nullification or impairment of the benefit as a result of the measure must be 
contrary to the reasonable expectations of the complaining party at the time of 
the agreement. The panel changed the third condition as nullification or 
impairment of the benefit due to the application of the measure that could not 
have been reasonably expected by the exporting Member. 
A key difference between a traditional non-violation case and the present 
one would be that the question of "reasonable expectation" is whether or not it 
                                                                 
35  Japan - Film, at paragraph 10.41, citing, EEC - Oilseeds, BISD 37S/86, paragraphs 142-152;  
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was reasonably to be expected that the benefit under an existing concession 
would be impaired by the measures. However here, the question is whether or not 
there was a reasonable expectation of an entitlement to a benefit that had accrued 
pursuant to the negotiation rather than pursuant to a concession.36 
(2) Non-violation Claims in the Context of Principles of 
Customary International Law 
The non-violation remedy, which has developed in GATT/WTO, should 
not be viewed in isolation from general principles of customary international law. 
The basic premise is that Members should not take actions, even those consistent 
with the letter of the treaty, which might serve to undermine the reasonable 
expectations of negotiating partners. The Panel viewed that this was a further 
development of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the context of Article 
XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1947. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is expressed 
in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention as follows: 
"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith." 
The non-violation doctrine goes further than the object and purpose of the 
treaty as expressed in its terminology. One must respect actual provisions (i.e., 
concessions) as far as their effect on competitive opportunities is concerned. It is 
an extension of the good faith requirement in this sense. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, BISD II/188, 192-193. 
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Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations 
between the WTO Members. Such international law applies to the extent that the 
WTO treaty agreements do not "contract out" from it. The Panel viewed that the 
customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties to the extent there 
is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a covered WTO agreement 
that implies differently. 
According to the Panel, if non-violation represents an extension of the 
good faith requirements in the implementation of a treaty and can also be applied 
to good faith and error in negotiations under the GPA, and the special remedies 
for non-violation contained in DSU Article 2637 should also be applied, as Korea 
had argued, rather than the traditional remedies of treaty law which are not 
suitable to the situation of the GPA.38 
(a) The Traditional Approach: Extended pacta sunt servanda 
Because the United States raised the non-violation issue in this dispute 
under the traditional approach, the Panel examined the facts of the dispute in that 
context first. The Panel ran the analysis slightly different from that of previous 
GATT non-violation cases as follows: (1) there was an agreed concession on 
entities; (2) resulting from that there was a reasonable expectation of enjoying 
competitive bidding opportunities; (3) an action which does not violate GPA 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
36 supra, paragraphs 7.84-7.87 
37 Article 26:1(a) of the DSU requires that: "[T]he complaining party shall present a detailed justification in 
support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered 
agreement." 
38 supra, paragraphs 7.93-7.102 
 35 
rules is taken by the Member that made the concession, including the concessions 
on entities; and (4) resulting from that, the expected competitive bidding 
opportunities are not available and the benefits of the concession have been 
nullified and impaired.  
The February 1991 explanation noted airport coverage under the Ministry 
of Transportation and it showed two unnamed regional airport authorities and 
one named airport entity. The IIA project was not mentioned nor was KAA. The 
meaning of the proposed Note 1 to Annex 1 was clarified in a manner which 
clearly indicated it was intended as a guide to the scope of the coverage under 
Annex 1. 
On 1 May 1991, the United States sent a series of questions to Korea 
including a question regarding coverage of airport construction. On 31 May 1991, 
the Korea National Assembly enacted the Seoul Airport Act which Korea had 
told the panel was the legal basis for the shift of authority away from MOCT.  
Otherwise the Aviation Act would have required that the Minister of 
Transportation build the facility. On 26 June 1991, the Ministry of Transportation 
began the preparatory legislative work that would result in KAA being 
designated in December 1991 as the responsible entity for the IIA project. 
On 1 July 1991, Korea provided its response to the US questions: 
"The new airport construction is being conducted by the New Airport 
Development Group under the Ministry of Transportation. The responsible 
organisation for procurement of goods and services relating to the new airport 
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construction is the Office of Supply. But at present, the concrete procurement 
plan has not been fixed because now the whole airport construction project is 
only in a basic planning stage." 
 On 10 July 1991, the MOT published a public notice of draft legislation 
containing proposed amendments to the Seoul Airport Act. On 21 October 1991, 
the draft legislation was transferred to the National Assembly and was adopted 
by the National Assembly on 20 November 1991 and signed by the President and 
published in the Official Gazette on 14 December 1991. 
The Panel reminded the panel in Japan – Film. In one situation that arose 
in that dispute, the United States showed that the relevant measure (a Cabinet 
Decision) was only published nine days before the conclusion of the Kennedy 
Round of negotiations. The panel made the following finding: 
"Because of the short time period between this particular measure's publication 
and the formal conclusion of the Kennedy Round, we consider it difficult to 
conclude that the United States should be charged with having anticipated the 
1967 Cabinet Decision since it would be unrealistic to expect that the United 
States would have had an opportunity to reopen tariff negotiations on individual 
products in the last few days of a multilateral negotiating round." 
On the other hand, when the measure pre-dated the conclusion of the  
Round by a month and a half, the panel reached a different conclusion. 
The Panel summarized their conclusion non-violation claims as follows: 
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Korea's answer to the US question in July 1991 was insufficient. Members have a 
right to expect full and forthright answers to their questions submitted during 
negotiations, particularly with respect to Schedules of affirmative commitments 
such as those appended to the GPA. However, Members must protect their own 
interests as well and in this case the United States did not do so. It had a 
significant amount of time to realize, particularly in light of the wide knowledge 
of KAA's role, that its understanding of the Korean answer was not accurate.  
Therefore, we find that, even if the principles of a traditional non-violation case 
were applicable in this situation the United States has failed to carry its burden of 
proof to establish that it had reasonable expectations that a benefit had accrued.39 
(b) Errors in Treaty Formation 
The traditional claim of non-violation does not fit well with the situation 
existing in this dispute. Non-violation claims, as the doctrine has developed over 
the course of GATT and WTO disputes, have been based on nullification or 
impairment of benefits reasonably expected to flow from negotiated concessions.  
In this case, it was the negotiations that  allegedly gave rise to the reasonable 
expectations rather than any concessions. 
Korea's response to the US question was not as forthright and could be 
characterized as at best incomplete in light of existing Korean legislation and 
ongoing plans for further legislation. The  Panel inquired as to whether the United 
                                                                 
39 id, paragraphs 7.103-7.119 
 38 
States was induced into error about a fact or situation which it assumed existed in 
the relation to the agreement being negotiated regarding Korea's accession to the 
GPA. In this case, it clearly appears that the United States was in error when it 
assumed that the GPA as a result of the entity coverage offered by Korea covered 
the IIA project. 
Error in respect of a treaty is a concept that has deve loped in customary 
international law through the case law of the Permanent International Court of 
Justice and of the International Court of Justice. Since article 48 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 196940 has been derived largely from case 
law of the relevant jurisdiction, the PCIJ and the ICJ, there can be little doubt that 
it presently represents customary international law and the panel applied it to the 
facts of this case.  
In the treaty negotiations, the United States believed that the IIA project 
was covered, but it was not correct. The Panel viewed from the behavior of the 
United States that this purported concession arguably formed an essential basis of 
its consent to be bound by the treaty as finally agreed. Hence the initial 
conditions for error under Article 48(1) of the Vienna Convention seem to us to 
be satisfied. However, Article 48(2) is another question. 
                                                                 
40 Article 48 of the Vienna Convention (Error) read as follows: 
1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty if the error 
related to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when the treaty was 
concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error or if the 
circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error. 
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Although the duty to demonstrate good faith and transparency in GPA 
negotiations is particularly strong for the "offering" party, this does not relieve 
the other negotiating partners from their duty of diligence to verify these offers as 
best as they can. The Panel did not think the evidence at all supports a finding 
that the United States had contributed by its own conduct to the error, but given 
the elements had mentioned earlier (such as the two and a half year interval 
between Korea's answer to the US question and its final offer, the actions by the 
European Community in respect of Korea's offer, the subsequent four-month 
period, of which at least one month was explicitly designated for verification, 
etc.), they viewed that the circumstances were such as to put the United States on 
notice of a possible error. 
 For these reasons, the Panel concluded that the US had not demonstrated 
error successfully as a basis for a claim of non-violation nullification or 
impairment of benefits.41 
 
V. Remaining Questions 
The main agenda for GPA, which are currently discussed in WTO, are 
further negotiations regarding improvement of GPA and extension of its coverage 
by the Committee on Government Procurement and development of transparency 
in government procurement practices by the Working Group on Transparency in 
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Government Procurement. 
 
1. Further Negotiations regarding Improvement of GPA and 
Extension of its Coverage  
Article XXIV:7(b) and (c) of the Agreement calls on the Parties, not later 
than the end of the third year from the date of its entry into force, to undertake 
further negotiations, with a view to improving the Agreement and achieving the 
greatest possible extension of its coverage among all Parties and eliminating any 
remaining discriminatory measures and practices.  
According to the article, the Committee on Government Procurement 
agreed to undertake an early review which was initiated in February 1997 in 
informal consultations, with an examination of modalities. This review has 
covered, in particular, the following elements: simplification and improvement of 
the Agreement, including adaptation to advances in the area of information 
technology; expansion of the coverage of the Agreement; and elimination of 
discriminatory measures and practices which distort open procurement. 
Base on a categorization of issues agreed to at the June 2000 meeting, 
Parties had discussions under the Article-by-Article review relating to Articles 
VII-XV and XVIII, paragraphs 1, 3 and 4, the basic principles of the Agreement 
(Articles XIX:1, III, IV, XVI, XVII:1), technical specifications (Article VI), and 
bid review (Articles XVIII:2, XX). Parties also considered the other aspects of 
the Article XXIV:7 negotiations - the elimination of discriminatory measures and 
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the expansion of coverage. 
A target date of these overall work programs will be mid-2001 or the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference if it held around that time.42 
An objective of the negotiations under Article XXIV:7 is the expansion of 
the membership of the Agreement by making it more accessible to non-Parties.  
In this connection, the Committee sent a communication to the WTO Members in 
1997, drawing their attention, as well as the attention of governments which are 
in the process of acceding to the WTO, to this work and inviting them to 
participate as observers in the meetings of the Committee. Considering 
discussion about the GPA in Uruguay Round was limited to the Parties only, it is 
a progress that discussion about the GPA was open to the non-Parties. 
 
2. Development of Transparency in Government Procurement 
Practices 
For the last three-and-a-half years the WTO has actively pursued a work 
programme on the subject of transparency in government procurement. This has 
been based on a mandate adopted by Ministers at the WTO Singapore Ministerial 
Conference held in December 1996 to: “establish a working group to conduct a 
study on transparency in government procurement practices, taking into account 
national policies, and, based on this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an 
                                                                 
42 WTO Committee on Government Procurement, Report (2000) of the Committee on Government 
Procurement, (GPA/44), 2 November 2000, p5 
 42 
appropriate agreement.”43 
The Singapore mandate reflects the heavy emphasis placed throughout 
the WTO system of rules and practices on transparency. The object of the 
transparency provisions in GPA is not only to ensure that adequate information 
on procurement opportunities is made available and that decisions are fairly 
taken, but also to facilitate monitoring of the commitments made under that 
Agreement not to discriminate against suppliers and supplies from other Parties.  
The WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, 
since its first meeting in May 1997, has met many times. The Working Group 
initiated its work by hearing presentations from other intergovernmental 
organizations which have international instruments and activities relevant to 
transparency in government procurement, notably the United Nations 
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank. It 
then considered a WTO comparative study of the transparency-related provisions 
in existing international instruments on government procurement procedures as 
well as in national practices. This covered the procedures under the plurilateral 
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the UNCITRAL Model Law and 
the World Bank Guidelines, as well as available material on national practices. 
The next stage in the work of the Working Group was the systematic 
study of 12 issues that were identified as important in relation to transparency in 
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government procurement. These are: definition and scope of government 
procurement; procurement methods; publication of information on national 
legislation and procedures; information on procurement opportunities, tendering 
and qualification procedures; time-periods; transparency of decisions on 
qualification; transparency of decisions on contract awards; domestic review 
procedures; other matters related to transparency; maintenance of records of 
proceedings; information technology; language; fight against bribery and 
corruption; information to be provided to other governments (notification); WTO 
dispute settlement procedures; and technical cooperation and special and 
differential treatment for developing countries. Written contributions on national 
practices, on issues meriting study and setting out ideas for action have been 
presented by many members to the Working Group. 
The work has shown a high degree of common thinking on many of the 
issues referred to above. The main questions on which further work is required 
include the scope of the transactions that would be covered by a transparency 
agreement, the treatment of single tendering practices, which are inherently less 
transparent, domestic review or challenge procedures and the applicability of 
WTO procedures for settling disputes between governments concerning 
allegations of non-compliance with the rules of a transparency agreement. 
Many individual Members have focused on transparency measures as a 
key element of their overall domestic efforts to build confidence in the 
management of government affairs, establish a stable and predicable commercial 
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environment, and provide a solid foundation for future growth and development. 
As these merits of Transparency in Government Procurement do not 
automatically guarantee for the developing countries to accede the market by 
accession of GPA, it is meaningful that the Working Group aimed at drawing up 
an agreement to which all WTO Members will be parties. In discussing about 
above-mentioned issues in Transparency in Government Procurement, domestic 
policy and practices of the development should be reflected. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The United States initiated this dispute because Korea's practices in the 
procurement for its Inchon airport project had favored Korean firms over foreign 
firms. The United States argued that Korea's practices, including the use of 
domestic partnering, short deadlines and certain licensing requirements were 
inconsistent with the GPA. Korea did not contest these claims but instead argued 
that the entities procuring for the airport project were simply not covered under 
its GPA obligations.  
The GPA coverage was defined by entity-based schedules as negotiated 
by individual parties to the Agreement. A GPA schedule typically consisted of a 
"positive" listing of entities that were covered, with explicit provisions. Korea's 
GPA schedule consisted of a "negative" listing of subdivisions, yet the Panel had 
treated it as a "positive" listing. The Panel had effectively narrowed Korea's GPA 
coverage contrary to the expectations of the United States. It also called into 
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question the balance of concessions achieved during the GPA negotiations. 
Additionally, in creating its own criteria to determine whether an unlisted entity 
was covered by the GPA on the basis of it being controlled by a GPA-covered 
entity, the Panel had not taken into account the possibility of a de facto control of 
the entities in question by other GPA-covered Korean entities. The Panel had 
held that the specific entities responsible for procurement at the Inchon 
International Airport were not included in Korea's commitments. The Panel had, 
therefore, concluded that the GPA did not even apply to procurements by those 
entities and had thus rejected the US claims.  
More importantly, the Panel had also rejected the US non-violation claim. 
The United States argued that it had reasonably expected that it had received 
Korea's commitment to extend GPA-consistent treatment to US suppliers for 
procurement for the Inchon International  Airport. The Panel had noted that the 
first step in analyzing any non-violation case was to determine whether there had 
been an agreed concession. In this particular case, there was no such a concession 
since the entities responsible for procurement at the Inchon International Airport 
were not included in Korea's commitments. The Panel had noted that a 
non-violation case could not be sustained. The Panel had stated that an 
alternative, non-traditional type of non-violation claim could be sustained, under 
customary international law rather than under the DSU or the GPA, on the basis 
of reasonable expectations accrued pursuant to negotiations rather than 
concessions. Even under its non-traditional analysis, the Panel had concluded 
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that the US expectations of the GPA's coverage for the entities responsible for 
Inchon Airport procurement were not reasonable.  
 
For Korea, the most difficult part in this dispute was to explain Korean 
institutional system to the Panel as well as the United States since it was difficult 
to understand logically. It was also a pivotal point in the dispute. However, the 
Panel correctly understood Korean legal system. 
The lessons Korea can get in this dispute are as follows:  
First, even though there have been large progress in negotiation 
technology in trade as 5 years have passed since the WTO system started, there 
remain many rooms to improve in the legal area. Therefore, more participation of 
lawyers is desirable in process of negotiation, submission of concession schedule 
and dispute settlement in order to discipline the legal expert. 
Second, it is necessary to correctly translate the Korean laws into English.  
The correction of the translation in a trade dispute causes distrust in our position. 
If the legal documents were correctly translated, it results in induction of more 
investment and prevention of trade dispute. We can recall how the parties argued 
the meaning of the word in related legal documents in this dispute. 
Third, legislation system should be improved. In Korea, when a law is 
established, they do not specify the related law or the parent law. Accordingly, it 
requires very complicated examinations to find which law is related to a law. 
Sometimes, we come to realize that some laws and regulations are inconsistent in 
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process of examinations. Therefore, we must be careful when we establish a law 
or a regulation. 
In WTO, the Members are currently discussing about the GPA 
amendments for the next round as follows: further negotiations regarding 
improvement of GPA and extension of its coverage by the Committee on 
Government Procurement and development of transparency in government  
procurement practices by the Working Group on Transparency in Government 
Procurement. In this regard, Korea should actively participate in the discussions 
and prepare for the future bearing these live lessons in mind. It is hoped that the 
present review and discussion can initiate more in-depth research and 
contemplation on this agenda. 
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